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Abstract
Rapid technological changes, which are mainly the result of the progress in computer 
technology, in the last decades of the twentieth century, have touched every area of life 
and have enforced numerous innovations. Modern ways of communication and exchange 
of information, especially the development of social media, have led to a significant and 
complex transformation of the traditional media. Practically all media companies around 
the world, in order to maintain their position on the market, have had to make decisive 
modifications of their ways of working. On one hand they remained available to the users of 
traditional media, but on the other hand, they look for effective ways of reaching all those 
who are using only new ways. Similarly, the Vatican media could not remain indifferent 
to the issues mentioned above. For several years the Vatican has initiated a process of 
preparation for a general reform of its media institutions. However, these works have 
accelerated at a great rate during the pontificate of Pope Francis.
The reform of the Vatican media is not an easy task. It concerns several independent 
institutions. Each one of them has their own history and way of announcing the Gospel. 
The widespread computerization, especially the development of the internet and social 
media, has also forced the Vatican to reflect on new ways of communicating. Among many 
questions, the most important were about the effectiveness of evangelization through the 
media, the ways of spreading the Pope’s message around the world to as many faithful as 
possible, and about the costs of necessary investments that would allow further, dynamic 
development and effective functioning of the Vatican media.
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Abstract
The article presents, in a synthetic manner, the mechanism of introducing the Stalinist 
system in Poland and describes its essence. It points to the importance of – until now 
given less value in the relevant literature – the mechanism of elimination of institutions 
and persons representing the constitutional order and state-creating social fabric, as well 
as introducing in their place representatives of the lowest social classes and institutions 
impersonating Polish centres of power, but in fact fully dependent on the USSR. The text 
focuses on political and social issues, as well as on the extensive  repression apparatus.
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1. Stalinism
Stalinism is a termused in the related literature to define the period of the rule 
of Joseph Stalin – first in the USSR, then in the Eastern Bloc – but, above all, 
to define the methods of exercising his authority. The term is, however, not 
precise, and the periodization of this phenomenon also varies.1 However, it can 
be assumed that in the USSR Stalinism had crystallized in the 1930s, and after 
the war it was instilled in the countries occupied by the Red Army. The decline 
of the ideology and system of exercising power is associated with the death 
of Joseph Stalin in 1953.However, in the Eastern bloc countries the turning 
point cameonly later. With regard to the “people’s” Poland, those historians 
who accept Stalinism as a form of ideological pressure, believe that it began 
in 1948. On the other hand those who recognize repression and intimidation 
of society to be the leading features of Stalinismmark its beginning in 1944. For 
the purposes of this article, it is assumed that Stalinism in Poland began in 1944, 
along with the occupation of its territory by the Red Army, to reach its mature 
form in 1948. It finished in 1956, the year of the political “thaw” and the change 
of the tools of exercising power.
Undoubtedly, it should be said that in the history of Poland the Stalinist years 
constituted a period, during which the communist party exercisedtotalitarian 
power. The years 1944–1948 should be considered as the time during which 
the totalitarianism would attain its full form, to be then followed by erosion 
between the years 1954–1956. It seems that although the discussion between 
historians and political scientists continues, the political system in the post-
1957 People’s Republic of Poland should be described as a system with strong 
totalitarian tendencies.
 1 See definitions of  Stalinism in  e.g.: Leksykon historii powszechnej 1900–1945, ed. 
S.  Sierpowski in  collaboration with S.  Żerko, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 
1996, pp. 415–416; J. Palmowski, Słownik najnowszej historii świata 1900–2007, v. 5: przy-
unia, Rzeczpospolita, Prószyński i s-ka, Warszawa 2008, pp. 115–116; Słownik polityki, ed. 
M. Bankowicz, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa 1996, pp. 263–264; See also: L. Kołakowski, 
Główne nurty marksizmu, p.  III: Rozkład, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań, no date of  issueavailable, 
pp. 7–220.
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2. The Stalinisation process in the political, social,  
and economic spheres
In connection with the approach adopted for the purposes of this paper, t the 
basic elements of the process aimed at installing the Stalinist system in Poland 
will be indicated. As intended by Moscow, the areas occupied by the Red Army 
at the end of the World War II were to remain in the Soviet sphere of influence. 
In the case of Poland, these plans were complicated owing to the existence 
of constitutional authorities in exile and civil and military structures of the 
Polish Underground State in conspiracy. Therefore, the Soviet plans provided 
for the formation of institutions imitating the Polish authorities, though fully 
dependent on the Kremlin and for their presentation on the international arena 
as democratic bodies. The concept held that the role of the substitute of legisla-
tive power was to be exercised by the State National Council (Krajowa Rada 
Narodowa, KRN), while the executive power would be exercised by the Pol-
ish National Liberation Committee (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, 
PKWN), transformed subsequently into a Provisional Government. This set 
off the process of forming, under the protection of the Red Army, the commu-
nist administration in the territory which, in line with Stalin’s intention, were 
to become the post-war Poland.2 The importance of the foregoing statement 
lies in the fact that virtually half of the pre-war territory of the Polish Republic 
was incorporated into the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, in the west and north, after the preliminary findings made 
at the Teheren conference, by way of decisions made at conferences in Yalta and 
Potsdam, Poland obtained new territories at the expense of the Third Reich. 
In the territories incorporated into the USSR there was the establishment of the 
Soviet administration of the Lithuanian, Belarussian and Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republics. In the post-Yalta Poland, a communist administration was 
created, while, at the same time, the civilian and military structures of the 
 2 See e.g.: K. Kersten, Narodziny systemu władzy. Polska 1943–1948, Kantor Wydawniczy 
SAWW, bmw, 1990; Eadem, Między wyzwoleniem a zniewoleniem. Polska 1944–1956, Aneks, 
bmw, 1993; See also.: R.  Bäcker, Ewolucja niesuwerenności PRL. Typy podległości kraju 
podporządkowanego wobec totalitarnej metropolii, in: W objęciach Wielkiego Brata. Sowieci 
w Polsce 1944–1993, ed. K. Rokicki, S. Stępień, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warszawa 2009, 
pp. 47–56; Polska-ZSRR. Struktury podległości. Dokumenty WKP(b) 1944–1949, prepared 
by A. Kochański, A. Paczkowski i in., Instytut Nauk Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 
Warszawa 1995; A. Skrzypek, Mechanizmy uzależnienia. Stosunki polsko-radzieckie 1944–1957, 
Akademia Humanistyczna w Pułtusku, Pułtusk 2002.
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Polish Underground State were liquidated by the Soviet NKVD. Indeed, until 
the autumn of 1945, the Soviet secret services played a key role in the destruc-
tion of the Polish independence conspiracy.3 The last mass pacification action 
conducted by the NKVD and the Red Army in the Polish territory was the so-
called Augustów roundup in July 1945, as a result of which some 600 people, 
recognized by the Soviets as activists of the Polish underground, were arrested 
and murdered.4
The process of installing the communist administration would be either 
preceded by, or carried out along with, the operation of liquidating the under-
ground bodies of the Polish constitutional authorities, which was accompanied 
by Stalin’s denial on the international arena of the legal Polish authorities in exile.
For the power overtaking stage to end successfully, for the communists who 
enjoyed minimal political support, to take full control over the state, the “politi-
cal engineering” mechanisms had to be supported by the “social engineering” 
and “terrorism engineering” processes.
The first one consisted in the reconstruction of the social fabric, and its 
essence boiled down to reversing the social ladder. The pre-war political elites 
were pushed to the margins of social life, and a mechanism was created for 
promoting the existing lowest social class, on the condition, however, that they 
would declare their support for the new system.
The logic of this process worked to the rhythm of the so-called social re-
forms which were ostensibly aimed at pursuing the goals of socialist equality 
in access to goods. In practice they disrupted some social strata and led to the 
monopoly of the communist state of the property and labour market. Such 
changes included:
 ▪ the 1944 “land reform”, which caused the pauperization of landowners;
 ▪ the nationalization of the key industries which affected private entre-
preneurs;
 ▪ the so-called “Battle for trade” which affected private entrepreneurs 
and craftsmen;
 3 P.  Kołakowski, NKWD i  GRU na  ziemiach Polskich 1939–1945. Kulisy wywiadu 
i kontrwywiadu, Dom Wydawniczy Bellona, Warszawa 2002; G. Motyka, Na białych Polaków 
obława. Sowieckie wojska NKWD w walce z polskim podziemiem 1944–1953, Wydawnictwo 
Literackie, Kraków 2014; NKWD i polskie podziemie 1944–1945. Z „teczek specjalnych” Józefa 
W. Stalina, ed. A. F. Noskowa [Polishedition A. Fitowa], Universitas, Kraków 1998.
 4 Obława Augustowska – lipiec 1945 r. Wybór źródeł, ed. Jan Jerzy Milewski, Anna Pyżewska, 
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Białystok 2010.
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 ▪ the nationalization of the service industry, specifically affecting craftsmen;
 ▪ the education “reform” (including higher education), which resulted 
in removing part of the pre-war professorship from schools and uni-
versities;
 ▪ collectivization which affected the richer (and usually more enlight-
ened) layers of the peasantry;
 ▪ the principle of the secularity of the state, which affected the clergy, 
primarily, the Catholic one.5
This process was aggravated by the activities related to the elimination of or-
ganizations and environments invoking the idea of an independent Polish Re-
public. One can just imagine the scale of social changes which led to virtually 
the total reconstruction of the social structure and hierarchy.6 This was all the 
more so because these deliberate political actions were carried out under condi-
tions of enormous war losses, and were accompanied by a process of population 
relocation, so far unprecedented in the history of Poland. As a consequence 
of the war losses and redrawing of borders, the population of Poland dropped 
to approximately 24 million people, which meant that with respect to the Sec-
ond Polish Republic, we lost almost 30% of the population. Another problem 
was the condition of the society which resulted from both military actions and 
the intentional policy of both occupants –the German and the Soviet ones. The 
consequence of redrawing borders and war damage was mass migration and 
resettlement, coordinated by the authorities. Some 7 million people are estimated 
to have been part of the above-mentioned processes in the years between 1944 
and 1950. About 2 million people were resettled to Poland from the territories 
seized by the USSR. In turn, about 500,000 of Belarusians, Lithuanians, and 
Ukrainians were moved to the USSR. At the same time, some 2.5 million Ger-
mans were resettled from the recovered post-German territories in the west 
 5 D.  Jarosz, Polacy a  stalinizm 1948–1956, Warszawa 2000; R. Kaczmarek, Historia 
Polski 1914–1989, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2010, pp. 560–569; Reforma 
rolna 1944–1945 czy komunistyczna zbrodnia? Dokumenty i materiały, świadectwa, wnioski, 
Polskie Towarzystwo Ziemiańskie, Warszawa 2009; F. Starowieyski, K. Uniechowska, Franciszka 
Starowieyskiego opowieść o końcu świata, czyli reforma rolna, Czytelnik, Warszawa 1994; 
H. Słabek, O społecznej historii Polski 1945–1989, Książka i Wiedza, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki 
Krajowej w Kutnie, Warszawa 2009, pp. 73–103.
 6 See e.g.: J. Lewandowski, Rodowód społeczny powojennej inteligencji polskiej (1944–1949), 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Szczecin 1991; H. Palska, Nowa inteligencja w Polsce Ludowej, Instytut 
Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, Warszawa 1994.
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and north, and approximately 1 million had left these areas prior to launching 
the deportation action.7
In the years 1945–1946, over 700,000 Poles deported for forced labour to the 
Third Reich returned. Another 600,000 of the deportees found themselves 
in the country due to the redrawing of borders – they were working in German 
plants located in the areas incorporated to Poland following the war. However, 
a significant number of Poles remained outside the borders, some 1.6 million 
in the USSR, and additionally approximately 1.5 million people of Polish descent, 
whom the Soviets did not recognize as Poles.
Territorial changes, migrations and deportations, which cut off the exist-
ing social ties, significantly facilitated taking control over the Polish society 
by communists. People damaged by several-year-long occupation, in many cases 
deprived of family support, torn from the place where their families would have 
lived for generations, were busy mostly with organizing anew their own and 
their loved ones’ lives. In such a situation, the issues of state sovereignty or the 
legitimacy of the communist authorities were often of secondary importance.
In the political sphere, the above-described processes were reinforced by the 
activities resulting in the construction of a one-party system in the “people’s” 
Poland, which maintain the appearance of multi-party.
The founding of the Polish United Workers’ Party in 1948 is considered 
as symbolic in the crystallization of the one-party system, although in fact it was 
only completed in subsequent years. Established in 1949 was the United Peasant 
Party, whilst the Labour Party was liquidated in 1950, part of its activists having 
been absorbed by the Democratic Party. The party system being formed at that 
time was to survive until 1989. The Polish United Workers’ Party exercised its 
prevailing, monopolistic position of the political sovereign, while the United 
Peasant Party worked as it’s “conveyor belt” in the rural areas, and the Demo-
cratic Party played a similar role in urban environments. Both smaller parties 
are termed “satellite” parties by political scientists, and their dependence – both 
political and personal – on the Polish United Workers’ Party was beyond any 
question.8
 7 R. Kaczmarek, Historia Polski 1914–1989…, pp. 545–559; B. Ociepka, Deportacje, 
wysiedlenia, przesiedlenia – powojenne migracje z Polski i do Polski, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań 
2001; H. Słabek, O społecznej historii Polski…, pp. 63–72.
 8 See e.g.: J.  Wrona, System partyjny w  Polsce 1944–1950. Miejsce, funkcje, relacje 
partii politycznych w warunkach budowy i utrwalania system u totalitarnego, Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 1997.
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The mature political system in the Stalinist version was, in fact, the mo-
nopolistic formula of the communist party’s power. State institutions were 
only a façade, because real power remained in the hands of the Polish United 
Workers’ Party, whose leader was at the same time – regardless of formally 
held state functions – the actual decision-making centre in every respect relat-
ing to public life. The power of the leader was, however, limited to the spheres 
so indicated by Moscow, while any political plans regarding the other spheres 
required consultation with the centre of the Soviet empire, or with instruc-
tions already given by the Kremlin. The fuse that allowed to control the actions 
of Polish communists were the Soviets operating in Polish ministries as “ad-
visors”, or officers of the Red Army directed to serve in the “people’s” Polish 
Army. In 1944–1956, the dependence of the “people’s” Poland on the USSR was 
almost total.
The key component of Stalinism was ideology, whose extent or effective-
ness was strengthened by a tight system of preventive censorship. The com-
munist ideology, one of the pillars of which was the “cult of the leader“ – above 
all, of  Joseph Stalin, but in  the Eastern bloc countries also of  local lead-
ers – also pervaded the sphere of culture. In the Stalinist period, the obliga-
tory style in culture was socialist realism, and never in the history of com-
munism was the ideology imposed on culture with such force. At the same 
time, the sovietizationof Poland meant uniformity in  every sphere of  life. 
Institutions, organizations, and associations existing independently of  the 
communist government were liquidated, and those which were established 
in their place, or over which the communists took control, were subjected 
to ideological pressure, their objective having become the activities supporting 
political power.
The communist ideology, and therefore politics, pervaded every sphere 
of public life, but the party also made claims to the private life of citizens of the 
“people’s” Poland. It asked for passiveness and for commitment to the system, 
and considered an opponent any person not engaged enough in building 
the communist system and supporting the ideology proclaimed by the party, 
including those communists who declared a communist ideology different 
from the one presented by the Bolesław Bierut team.
Rebuilt from 1944, the economy was largely nationalized, partially so-
cialized, and free market mechanisms were replaced by  the so-called 
centrally managed economy. In  order to  phase it  in, the so-called Three-
Year Plan (1947–1949) was launched, while Stalinism achieved its full 
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maturity in the economy during the implementation of the Six-Year Plan (1949– 
1955).9
3. Stalinist repression system
One of the pillars of the so-called Stalinist system was a repression apparatus, 
of which the first-stage objective was to liquidate constitutional authorities, 
followed by breaking the remaining independence structures – those acting 
openly and those in conspiracy –and pacification of society, instilling fear, and 
subordination to the communist authorities.
The repression apparatus served a number of objectives, to point out a few 
general ones:
 ▪ in the years 1944–1948, the basic goal was to take over the state struc-
tures using the mechanism of mass repression. At this stage, repres-
sion was generally aimed at active opponents of the system and their 
character was extremely violent;
 ▪ in the years 1949–1956, the basic goal was to conquer society using 
the mechanism of common repression. Repression softened a little, 
but it affected much wider social circles –also the passive and po-
tential opponents of the system, and their aim was to keep up the 
atmosphere of fear;10
In the initial stage, that is more or less until the autumn of 1945, the domes-
tic repression apparatus played a secondary role in the activities of the Soviet 
services. For it was primarily the Red Army and secret services of the USSR 
that destroyed the structures of the Polish Underground State. They also played 
an important – and sometimes decisive – role in pacifying independence orga-
nizations being formed upon the dissolution of the Home Army. The repression 
apparatus turned against the independence environments continuing activities 
of the Polish Underground State – whether overtly (the Polish Peasant Party 
 9 See e.g.: R. Kaczmarek, Historia Polski 1914–1989…, pp. 570–613; A.L. Sowa, Historia 
polityczna Polski 1944–1991, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2011, pp. 127–192.
 10 See e.g.: A.  Dudek, A.  Paczkowski, Polska, in: Czekiści. Organy bezpieczeństwa 
w europejskich krajach bloku sowieckiego 1944–1989, ed. K. Persak, Ł. Kamiński, Instytut 
Pamięci Narodowej, Warszawa 2010, p. 393–457; A. A. Paczkowski, Polacy pod obcą i własną 
przemocą, in: Czarna księga komunizmu. Zbrodnie, terror, prześladowania, introduction to the 
Polish edition K. Kersten, Prószyńskii s-ka, Warszawa, no issue date available, pp. 351–359.
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or Labour Party), or covertly (the post-Home Army structures – with the “Free-
dom and Independence” or national ones – with the National Military Union) 
but also against pre-war activists and politicians representing the ethos of the 
independent Second Polish Republic. These activities created the conditions for 
installing the communist administration.
After the pacification of overt and covert resistance, after the January 1947 
elections falsified by the communists, there followed general terror, aimed 
at conquering the society. Repressions began to affect not only those who con-
tinued fighting for an independent country, but also potential opponents of the 
communist system, and even those communists who were considered represen-
tatives of the political group opposing sovietization in the form imposed by the 
Bolesław Bierut team. At that time, various repressions hit those people whom 
the security service would associate with: state service in the Second Polish Re-
public; peasants opposing collectivization; former activists of the Polish Under-
ground State; activists of the postwar underground –both political and military 
(including those who emerged during the so-called Amnesty), as well as people 
who cooperated with them or offered support; former activists and collaborators 
of open opposition parties; youth, who at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s were in-
volved in building underground independence organizations; the clergy – above 
all, the Catholic one, and to a lesser degree also other churches and religions, 
including, among others, Jehovah’s Witnesses; people accused of so-called word-
of-mouth propaganda (i.e, telling political jokes or criticizing the communist 
system in private conversations); people who would maintain contact with those 
in political exile or even people outside the Eastern Bloc (accused of espionage); 
private entrepreneurs and craftsmen (often accused of  speculation); work-
ers (accused, for example, of economic sabotage); communist activists having 
a different vision of the communization process in Poland from that one rep-
resented by the Bolesław Bierut team (accused of rightist-nationalist deviation).
The situation began to change in the mid-1950s. After the death of Józef 
Stalinin March 1953, the symptoms of the “thaw” in the Soviet bloc and thus 
the departure from the so-called Stalinism became noticeable, which was re-
lated, among other things, to a decline in the repressions of communist systems. 
However, the process was not homogenous in the Eastern bloc. In the “people’s” 
Poland, it was much delayed. 1953 marked the climax of activities directed against 
the Catholic Church (among the distinguishing indicators thereof were the so-
called trial of the Kraków Curia, trial of Bishop Czesław Kaczmarek, and the 
internment of the Primate Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński).
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In the years 1944–1956, the security service was one of the basic tools of the 
communist party used for purposes of deep reconstruction of the social struc-
ture. The natural state elite: the activists and soldiers of the Polish Underground 
State, who during the World War II had borne the burden of fighting for in-
dependence, were annihilated. The refugee elites were rejected the possibility 
of returning to the country. Outside the post-Yalta Polish borders, outstanding 
representatives of the Polish political and cultural world were stranded along 
with a significant part of the Polish army. Their subordinates in the country 
were murdered, imprisoned, forced to keep silent or to collaborate. Repressions 
targeted at those political activists and guerrillas who continued their fight for 
independence – many a time pre-war officers – resulted in the patriotic elite 
having been murdered or destroyed through incarceration.
The communist repression system was extensive and included a number 
of institutions whose activities complemented one another. Its main  components 
were:
1. Civilian political police or the Public Security Department (1944), the 
Ministry of Public Security (1945–1954), the Committee on Public Security 
(1954–1956);
2. Citizens’ Militia (subordinated to the Ministry of Public Security);
3. Military Intelligence – meaning counterintelligence and political police 
in the “people’s” Polish Army;
4. Reconnaissance Unit of the Border Protection Forces;
5. Board of the 2nd General Staff of the “people’s” Polish Army;
6. Judicial authorities, the Military District Courts and Military District 
Prosecutor’s Offices were key for the so-called political issues, but there also 
existed secret sections in common courts or special criminal courts;
7. Out-of-court adjudication institutions: Special Committee on Combating 
Fraud and Economic Malpractice, magistrates courts;
8. The prison and forced-labour camp system.11
 11 See e.g.: S. Cenckiewicz, Długie ramię Moskwy. Wywiad wojskowy Polski Ludowej 1943–
1991. Zysk i spółka, Warszawa 2011, pp. 47–126; P. Fiedorczyk, Komisja Specjalna do Walki 
z Nadużyciami i Szkodnictwem Gospodarczym 1945–1954. Studium historycznoprawne, Temida, 
Białystok 2002; B. Kopka, Obozy pracy w Polsce 1944–1950. Przewodnik encyklopedyczny, 
Ośrodek KARTA, Warszawa 2002; R. Leśkiewicz, R. Peterman, Wojskowe organy bezpieczeństwa 
państwa, in: Historyczno-prawna analiza struktur organów bezpieczeństwa państwa w Polsce 
Ludowej (1944–1990). Zbiór studiów, ed. A. Jusupović, R. Leśkiewicz, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 
Warszawa 2013, passim; P. Majer, Milicja Obywatelska w systemie organów władzy PRL: zarys 
problematyki i źródła, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2003; K. Szwagrzyk, Prawnicy 
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A tight-knit system of various institutions making up the repressive ap-
paratus allowed for targeting large social groups through internal intelligence 
operations, investigations (most often violent ones, during which physical and 
psychological torture was applied), to sentencing and imprisoning or detaining 
inforced-labour camps. These activities were accompanied by severe harass-
ments towards persons considered to be opponents or potential opponents 
of the communist regime, administrative penalties, surcharge tax, foreclosure 
of property, dismissal from work, hindering access to studies, etc.
The scale of the applied “fear engineering” may to some extent–but not pre-
cisely–be reflected through statistical data. In the years 1944–1946, the Soviet 
services arrested in the territory of the postwar Poland about 50,000 people, 
a large part of whom were then sent into the depths of the USSR (among them 
were not just Poles, but also Germans or Red Army deserters). This figure should 
be increased by an unspecified number of people repressed in the Polish Easter 
Borderlands incorporated into the USSR. In the years 1944–1956, the civilian 
security services arrested at least 250,000 people. At the same time, according 
to estimates, in 1947 alone, in connection with the elections falsified by the 
communists, there could be as many “detainees” without being presented any 
charges as 100,000, while in 1944–1956 it was probably no less than 400,000 
people. At the same time, it is estimated that in the years 1944–1956 Soviet and 
Polish security forces killed about 9,000 people in fights (not only Poles, but also, 
for instance, activists of the nationalist Ukrainian organizations). The military 
courts themselves sentenced over 70,000 people in the years 1944–1953. At the 
same time, we are aware that in the years 1944–1955 military courts rendered 
about 8,000 death sentences, of which about half were executed. Over 20,000 
people died in prisons and detention centres.12
The Stalinist system was a consistent mechanism maintaining full depen-
dency of the citizens of “people’s” Poland – ostensibly on the state, but in fact 
on the communist party.
czasu bezprawia. Sędziowie i prokuratorzy wojskowi w Polsce 1944–1956, Instytut Pamięci 
Narodowej, Kraków–Wrocław 2005, pp. 33–92; T.  Wolsza, W  cieniu Wronek, Jaworzna 
i Piechcina… 1945–1956. Życie codzienne w polskich więzieniach, obozach i ośrodkach pracy 
więźniów, Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warszawa 2003; M. Zaborski, Ustrój 
sądów wojskowych w Polsce w latach 1944–1955, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 2005.
 12 K. Madej, J. Żaryn, J. Żurek, Wstęp, in: Księga świadectw. Skazani na karę śmierci 
w czasach stalinowskich i ich losy, ed. iidem, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warszawa 2003, 
p. XXI-XXXVIII.
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4. The Deconstruction of the Stalinist system
The decline of  the Stalinist system in  the eastern bloc began after the death 
of Joseph Stalin in March 1953. The pace of its deconstruction in the Eastern 
bloc varied. In the “people’s” Poland, initially it was fully controlled by the com-
munists and first concerned the economic sphere, then the cultural sphere, and 
only the fleeing to the west of one of the high-ranking officers of the secret police 
gave it afresh impetus. Publicizing by the Radio Free Europe of so far hidden 
information about the essence of the communist system in Poland, its depen-
dence on Moscow, the scale of repression, and the true goals of party activists 
for a moment destabilized the otherwise fully controlled process of the “thaw”. 
The party managed to take control over it again, though the fear of the system 
decreased significantly, which was important for the eruption of aspirations for 
freedom. The workers’ revolt in Poznań in June 1956, the destabilization of the 
party team following the death of Bolesław Bierut in Moscow, Khrushchev’s 
criticism of Stalinism were the key elements giving rise to political changes and 
the final collapse of the totalitarian system in Poland.13 Although the discus-
sion on what the communist system was, following the “thaw”, has continued 
to date – the prevailing conviction seems to be that the post-1956 system was 
a  system displaying totalitarian tendencies, but notonetotally fulfilling the 
 definition of totalitarianism.
5. Conclusion
The studies conducted so far on Stalinism have emphasized the issues related 
to the repression and communist ideology, as well as the mechanism of virtual 
autocracy of leaders of political parties. Even research showing social issues 
is in fact limited to the problematic or quantitative definition of the discussed 
issue. The concept of “social engineering” was only associated with the process 
of exchanging political elites or building a “new socialist” man. Meanwhile, this 
was only one of the elements, complemented by the reversal of the social lad-
der. If we analyze the mechanism of Stalinism or the process of Sovietization 
 13 See e.g.: J. Karpiński, Wykres gorączki. Polska pod rządami komunistycznymi, Wydawnictwo 
UMCS, Lublin 2001, pp. 39–170; P. Machcewicz, Polski rok 1956, Oficyna Wydawnicza Mówią 
Wieki, Warszawa 1993; A.L. Sowa, Historia polityczna Polski 1944–1991…, pp. 193–288.
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of Poland, it will, in all its spheres, consist in the elimination of traditional values, 
environments, institutions, and mechanisms, to replace them with new ones 
modelled on those already functioning in the USSR. The essence of Stalinism was 
therefore not a reconstruction or taking over control, but a violent mechanism 
of elimination and replacement.
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